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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
• The accession of the states of Central and Eastern Europe to the EU in May 2004 was 
frequently perceived in the EU-15 as strengthening the Atlanticist element in Europe.  
The Atlanticism of the new member states is tempered by CEE governments who are 
trying to ensure that the EU and the US act together on the most important issues in 
international relations.  
• The importance attached to the assumed Atlanticist dimension of the last wave of 
enlargement has been overestimated.  The new member states have not proven to be the 
“Trojan horses of the US in Europe” as some senior political figures predicted prior to 
accession in May 2004. On the contrary, the new member states were instrumental in 
repairing the transatlantic rifts over Iraq.  
• Poland is likely to remain the most committed Atlanticist, along with the Baltic countries.  
The smaller Central European countries such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary 
and Slovenia, are likely to voice their support for US policies more cautiously, giving 
greater regard to the opinion of the major EU players.   
• The degree to which the foreign policy of the new member states will remain associated 
with idealistic goals is difficult to predict. But it can be assumed the longer the CEE 
countries are members of the EU, the more pragmatic their foreign policy will become.  
• During the first year of membership, the new member states took some strong stances on 
foreign policy issues such as the Czech Republic on Cuba or in case of Slovakia, Slovenia 
and Hungary on the issue of (not) opening the accession negotiations with Croatia.   
• Poland and the Balts have had mixed results in their attempt to shape the EU’s 
relationship with Russia. Their push for a more comprehensive EU-Russia policy is 
mainly driven by domestic considerations. However, such an assessment needs to be 
balanced with the fact that with no real EU-Russia policy Poland and the Balts have acted 
similarly to France, Germany or Italy who also tend to pursue national rather than 
European interest in this respect.   
• Poland has played an important role in engaging the EU in Ukraine, especially during the 
electoral crisis in 2004. However, to what extent Poland remains committed to pushing 
the other member states to recognize Ukraine as a candidate country is not clear yet. 
• The diversity of the EU’s new neighbours implies that it is difficult for the new member 
states to agree on which third states should be prioritised in terms of CFSP and to set a 
common front. Such diversity makes it difficult for CEE member states to propose a 
convincing plan to its EU partners for dealing with these new neighbours.  
• Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey are likely to have strong stakes at shaping the EU foreign 
policy in the future, particularly by getting the Black Sea region higher on the EU agenda.  
• The main dividing line across “New Europe” is likely to run between Poland and the 
Baltic states on one hand and the smaller Central European Countries (Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia) on the other, with the first group being more Atlanticist, 
more committed to push for a hard stance on Russia and recognition of the European 
aspirations of the countries in the EU near abroad. The second group is likely to keep a 
lower profile and “Europeanize” its foreign policy more quickly.  
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1.  Introduction 
A year has already passed since the ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe joined the 
European Union.  This period allows us to make the first reflections as to how the new member 
states have been behaving as full-fledged EU members.  While a lot of attention has been paid to 
the integration of the newcomers into the core policies of the Union, especially economically, 
what is often neglected is how the new members contributed to shaping the external relations of 
the enlarged EU.   
 
This paper will look at the impact of the new member states in the area of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy.1  It will make reflections on the track record of those states in the period 
since they joined the Union.  However, it will try to look beyond that and see what will be the 
likely path of their involvement in the domain of EU foreign policy in the future, with specific 
reference to the EUs “near neighbourhood“ and the internal dynamics of the integration process. 
It will try to give a broader picture of the region, with particular emphasis on points and areas 
that are relevant in this respect. It will also try to reflect to some extent on the positions of 
countries that are currently not EU members but which might become members in the future 
(candidate countries) and whose contribution to the way the EU acts in the world should be 
discussed and acknowledged even at this early stage.  
 
Prior to the “big bang” enlargement, Wolfgang Wessels suggested that three main scenarios could 
explain the behaviour of the new member states in the area of CFSP. The first scenario has been 
labelled as neutral where the newcomers would act passively and more or less follow the lead of 
the strongest players in foreign and security policies, i.e. EU-15 heavyweights such as France, 
Germany and the UK. Another scenario was labelled as pessimistic, suggesting that the newcomers 
will not behave constructively in CFSP and would in fact pursue their national interests, even if 
this meant damaging the internal cohesion of the EU. The third scenario, marked as optimistic, 
assumed a very active involvement of the CEE countries in the shaping of CFSP, bringing in new 
impetus, visions and expectations and thus helping to enforce the external action of the 
European Union.  This study will try to demonstrate that none of these scenarios can be applied 
to the group of new member states as such because in many aspects of foreign policy they simply 
do not act as a block. It will try to show that the elements of all the three scenarios can be traced 
in the behaviour of the new member states in EU foreign policy.  
 
                                                          
1 The notion of CFSP is for the purposes of this paper viewed in a very general sense and will include a wide range of EU external 
activities such as enlargement. On the other hand it will not focus too much on ESDP – a specific element of CFSP.   
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One characteristic often quoted in connection with the likely behaviour of the new member 
states in CFSP was that the May 2004 enlargement would be a strongly “Atlanticist” one. This 
assumption was further reiterated by the fact that five out of the ten countries that joined the EU 
in 2004 almost acceded to both the EU and NATO simultaneously. Not long prior to the 
signature of the treaties of accession, most of the soon-to-be members of the EU showed their 
commitment to the United States during the Iraq crisis, by signing the so called “Letter of Eight” 
(Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) and the “Vilnius Letter”.  This action was quoted to 
have caused very deep and serious splits in what was soon to become the enlarged European 
Union, giving ground to an infamous division of the continent into Old and New Europe.  
 
This paper will argue that the importance attached to the assumed Atlanticist dimension of the 
last wave of enlargement has been grossly overestimated.  The new member states did not prove 
to be the “Trojan horses of the US in Europe” as some politicians in the old-EU liked to put it.  
The question remains to what extent this has been due to the recent rapprochement between the 
EU and the US and to what extent it was the enlargement that caused this rapprochement. This 
paper will argue that the divisions evident during the Iraq crisis are not likely to be long lasting in 
nature. Furthermore, future divisions within the EU are probably not going to run between the 
old and the new member states but will emerge (or in fact are already emerging) within the New 
Europe as well as they are already evident within the Old Europe.  
 
Another point that deserves attention is the motives of the new member states with regard to EU 
foreign policy. These are often typified as being idealistic rather than pragmatic. It is not 
unreasonable to expect that the new member states would place greater stress on the role of 
values such as human rights, democracy, rule of law, etc.  when dealing with third parties through 
CFSP. The experience that the new members of the EU went through during communist times 
and also during the transformation period make them more sensitive to these issues and their 
importance within EU foreign policy. Most of the countries we are referring to have direct 
experience of the strong impact of the EU’s inclusion of democratic principles and conditionality 
in its foreign policy agenda. For this reason they do not underestimate the role of these 
instruments in precipitating internal policy changes in countries outside the EU. However, the 
question remains to what extent this phenomenon will prevail once the newcomers understand 
that EU member states often act pragmatically.   
 
Commentators have also discussed the geographical scope of the activity of the new member 
states in CFSP. It was expected that the newcomers would not be equally interested in all aspects 
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of CFSP, but that they would focus on the Eastern component of EU foreign policy. This has 
proved to be only partially true. This is because the new member states do not act as a unitary 
bloc. In fact, it is more appropriate to see each of the new members as having a foreign policy 
agenda in Eastern Europe that reflects a multitude of factors that are often specific to the history 
and aspirations of each state.   
 
At this juncture it is necessary to highlight the point that the three elements (i.e. Atlanticism, 
idealism and geographical preferences) regarding CEE countries behaviour in CFSP cannot be 
treated in isolation but should be seen as being interlinked and complementary strategies and 
processes. In this respect, factors such as Atlanticism, idealism and the geographical focus of 
CFSP will be treated in this paper in an integrated manner where each of these factors is seen to 
condition the impact of the others.   
 
2.  Setting the stage – New Member States during accession negotiations, 
Convention and Intergovernmental Conference 
 
Let us start with some general considerations relating to the involvement of the new member 
states in EU foreign policy. The first consideration is the negotiation of the CFSP chapter during 
the accession negotiations. It is hardly surprising that this chapter was usually among the first 
ones to be closed. This occurred for two main reasons. First, a relatively low portion of the acquis 
is devoted to the CFSP domain, which did not require an extensive process of adoption into 
domestic legislation. The most notable examples where the candidate countries had to adapt to 
EU requirements were related to the creation of political directors and European correspondents 
in foreign ministries, or putting a mechanism in place that would enable a swift imposition of 
sanctions vis-à-vis third parties. The other reason for relatively swift progress in negotiations was 
that since 1995 the candidate countries were often invited to join EU common positions and 
demarches, although their choice seemed at times rather arbitrary.2 The few examples of non-
alignment with EU common positions mainly related to problems of a technical nature (for 
instance Poland in the case of the EU’s declaration on land mines could not subscribe to a 
common stance as it had not ratified the Ottawa Convention), or in cases where the issue at stake 
were more sensitive because it concerned an area of particular interest,3 or it concerned other 
                                                          
2 The candidate countries were not invited to subscribe to EU common positions on the Middle East, the former Soviet Union or 
former Yugoslavia.   
3 For example, Poland did not condemn the government of Belarus in 1998 after it had expelled EU diplomats as it was holding 
the OSCE Presidency at that time (see ‘Bigger EU, wider CFSP, stronger ESDP,’ Institute for Security Studies, April 2002).    
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candidate countries.4 Hungary was the only candidate country that supported all EU common 
positions, statements and demarches without reservations.  
 
All the new member states (or earlier with the status of candidates or later acceding countries) 
had a chance to participate substantively in the discussions on how the EU Common Foreign 
and Security Policy will be framed in the future, including the work of the Convention and 
subsequently the Intergovernmental Conference. It can be argued that this particular area was of 
a strong interest to most of the new member states. Their positions on CFSP were not 
determined by the necessity of a detailed knowledge of the acquis a
                                                          
nd EU decision-making 
procedures. Although the representatives of most of the new member states kept a rather low 
profile in the Convention deliberations, it was in the area of CFSP and defence that they made 
their voices heard most.   
 
This can be explained by several motives. One of the most important was certainly the 
preoccupation of the accession countries with ensuring a strong transatlantic link especially in the 
area of security and defence, ensuring the compatibility between ESDP and NATO, and ensuring 
that the USA as the major ally will get involved in any future debates relating to the shaping of 
European security. The relations between ESDP and NATO were one of the focal points and 
posed a serious problem especially for those countries that were about to join NATO after the 
invitation issued by the Prague summit of the North Atlantic Council in November 2002, just as 
the Convention was starting to debate these issues. Their representatives looked rather 
suspiciously at attempts to put NATO aside and enhance the role of the EU in the defence arena.  
The representatives of the then candidate countries showed a rather reserved approach to some 
of the progressive arrangements suggested in course of the Convention deliberations, such as 
inclusion of a mutual defence clause in the Constitutional Treaty. There were even greater 
reservations in candidate countries about the Convention’s Presidium proposals for structured 
co-operation. This was perceived by many as a strategy for creating a European avant-garde in 
the area of security and defence. A self-constituted group of countries to be included in an 
additional protocol attached to the Treaty with an unclear guarantee of who could be admitted at 
a later stage caused much concern in Central and Eastern European capitals at the time. Such 
unease related to the fact that participation in structured co-operation would not allow most CEE 
countries to participate, because their military capacities were not sufficient and in many cases 
4 Some candidate countries did not support EU statements on OSCE missions and the state of Russian minorities in Estonia and 
Latvia.   
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undergoing major restructuring. This led to frequently expressed fears that the CEE states could 
be left out of the core areas of further integration.  
 
Equally, one must not forget that the Convention debates coincided with the escalation of the 
Iraq conflict which demonstrated deep and damaging cleavages in the EU, putting the EU 
candidate countries in a particularly uncomfortable position. Most of the candidate countries 
sided – at least rhetorically – with the US and its “coalition of the willing” which was strongly 
opposed by many important EU players, notably France and Germany. For this they earned 
some very critical remarks not only from Jacques Chirac but also from Commission President 
Prodi.5
                                                          
 From the perspective of the candidate countries, many clauses as suggested in the draft 
text of the Constitutional Treaty seemed to be aimed at institutionalising the divorce of Europe 
from the US in the security and defence fields, underlining the fact that the two sides of the 
Atlantic are likely to take different paths in the future. This was something that Central 
Europeans wanted to avert at any cost. However, they did not have enough power to do so, not 
least because according to the Convention rules of procedure they did not enjoy the same rights 
as the member states, in a sense they could not block the consensus among the existing EU 
members. They, however, found very strong supporters amongst the more Atlanticist members, 
namely the UK. Together they made a strong push at the IGC and achieved important 
amendments to the draft treaty which made the final draft of the mutual defence clause less 
“competitive” with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and “structured co-operation” more 
inclusive and NATO interconnected. But in this sense, it could be argued that the crucial point 
was the British “yes” to the proposal for structured co-operation. The positions of the candidate 
countries were seen to be less important.   
 
On the other hand, the candidate countries showed relatively strong support for some other 
progressive measures in CFSP, including the creation of the post of EU foreign minister as well 
as the European External Action Service. These two initiatives can be considered major 
improvements in the Constitutional Treaty in enhancing the coherence and efficacy of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. The objections of the candidate countries, if there were 
any, did not concern the concept of an EU foreign minister as such but rather his or her job 
description. After the draft Constitutional Treaty was adopted, some representatives claimed that 
the role of the foreign minister should be clarified, especially in relation to the President of the 
European Council and the College of Commissioners where he/she would act as one of the 
5 Arguably, Prodi´s remarks were even more damaging, especially for the political elites of the acceding countries as the 
Commission was often perceived as the best friend of the candidates unlike many of the EU-governments.   
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Vice-Presidents. The intergovernmental conference subsequently made major improvements in 
terms of clarifying these points.   
 
The motives of candidate countries for supporting this move may be explained by different 
considerations. The fact that most of the candidate states are small or at best middle-sized 
countries means they are not likely to view EU foreign policy as a way of projecting their own 
interests and ambitions. On the contrary – a stronger CFSP with a European foreign minister and 
its own diplomatic service might give them internally more influence over the way Europe acts 
on the world stage than they would have as separate actors in international relations, through the 
possibility of pulling together with more important players. The rather low profile of the 
candidate countries on many issues of international relations would allow them even to sacrifice 
more unanimity for QMV in EU foreign policy, because their stakes in many issues are not so 
strong and they do not necessarily want to keep their “red lines” like some of the major players. 
This assumption, however, proved somewhat disputable in the first year of EU membership, as 
will be explained later. A similar consideration would apply to the “anchoring” of the new post of 
EU foreign minister. Not surprisingly, many new member states would like to see this post 
attached more to the Commission rather than to the Council. The Commission provides for a 
much better way of influencing the policy processes by small and middle sized countries than the 
Council where there is a much greater risk of these countries being bullied by the larger member 
states. The truth is that the Constitutional Treaty does not yet provide for a definite answer as to 
whether the EU foreign minister will be acting more under the hat of the Council, being 
commanded by the member states, or in the Commission, acting more in the interest of the 
Union and being influenced by fellow commissioners. If the current political deal is that Solana 
would become the first EU foreign minister, the first scenario is more likely to prevail. Solana has 
been anchored in the Council for many years now and his way of running EU foreign and 
security policy will probably not change too much in the first years after the creation of the new 
post.   
 
For similar reasons the new member states are supportive of the European External Action 
Service. As many of the diplomatic services of the new member states are under strong pressure 
from finance ministries to cut down their political representation in third countries, especially 
where there are no particular ties, the European Foreign Service might turn out to be an 
attractive alternative. Especially because it is supposed to recruit its employees from the 
Commission, the Council and also from the member states’ diplomatic services, which would 
enable the European foreign service to utilize the expertise of certain diplomats and maintain 
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existing links. A European foreign service may give CEE countries a greater opportunity to set 
the agenda than is the case at the moment in the Council, because of its scarce resources and the 
less pro-active role of the current High Commissioner for CFSP who does not enjoy the right of 
initiative.  
 
But an important consideration will apply to where the future EU diplomatic service is anchored.  
At the moment, no definite scenario is on the table either – it could be under the Council, under 
the Commission, under both of them or it could be totally independent. The viewpoints of the 
new member states on this issue are not yet known, but it is certainly one of the things that 
politicians and foreign ministries in Central and East European capitals should start addressing 
very soon.  
 
3.  New Europe´s Atlanticism – an ever lasting love? 
As suggested earlier, the accession of the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe to 
the EU has often been perceived in the EU-15 as the one that will ultimately strengthen the 
Atlanticist element in Europe. Although it is difficult to provide a generally accepted definition of 
Atlanticism, in this paper it is perceived as foreign policy that tends to act in line with the 
position of the United States. In relation to membership in the EU Atlanticists prefer the EU and 
the US acting together in international relations rather than the EU adopting a different policy or 
acting on its own.   
 
The main reason for the alleged Atlanticism of the new EU member states prior to accession 
demonstrated itself during the course of the Iraq crisis when most CEE governments sided with 
the Bush administration. Firstly, there were the leaders of Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic who put their signatures along with representatives of the UK, Italy, Spain, Portugal and 
Denmark to the so-called “Letter of Eight”that appeared in the Wall Street Journal. Only later, did 
a similar initiative of the so-called Vilnius 10 group,6 (i.e. new members of NATO and/or states 
hoping to join the NATO in the CEE region) make a similar move. This made some EU leaders 
think that these countries will act as committed Atlanticists even after their accession to the EU 
(given the proximity of EU accession), putting good relations with Washington first and acting in 
support of the US no matter what the other EU governments think. It would be premature to 
assess only one year after accession the accuracy of this judgement. However, what is certain is 
that the picture in Central and Eastern Europe is much more complex than this simple 
                                                          
6 The Vilnius Group consisted of the following countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.   
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assumption of committed Atlanticism. Here one may identify two key reasons for expecting a 
more complex reality.  
 
Firstly, it would be wrong to assume that the alignment with US foreign policy is absolutely 
unconditional and non-contested in the new EU member states. Nonetheless, all the CEE 
countries that recently acceded to the EU can be labelled at least as “instinctive Atlanticists”7, 
meaning that they strongly believe in the value of the transatlantic partnership and any situation 
which forces them to make a choice between Washington and Brussels puts them in a very 
uncomfortable position.  
 
Secondly, the “instinctive” Atlanticism of the new member states derives mainly from their 
historical experience. The Central and Eastern Europe region has been for centuries dominated 
by different great powers. To a considerable extent all the countries in the region (with the 
exception of Hungary or Bulgaria), tend to view themselves as victims of the “concert of powers” 
up to World War I as well as of Western European pacifism prior to the outbreak of World War 
II. On the other hand, the United States is historically viewed very positively firstly as the 
champion of independent states in Central Europe (thanks to US President Wilson’s stance at the 
Versailles conference in 1919), and secondly because the United States honoured their 
commitments in the region, contributing to the defeat of communism leading to the end of the 
Cold War as well as supporting CEE countries joining NATO.  
  
Nonetheless, despite the undoubted importance of these two key 
                                                          
factors the degree of 
Atlanticism varies significantly across Central and Eastern Europe, depending on factors other 
than those that underpin “instinctive Atlanticism”. It would thus be a mistake to view the new 
EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe as a compact block who will always act in a 
unified manner in CFSP negotiations on the issue of future US-EU relations.   
 
3.1  Security considerations and Atlanticism  
Much of the evidence presented thus far supports the contention that differing perception of 
security threats determines the degree of each country’s Atlanticism. It has been suggested and 
demonstrated with regard to the involvement of candidate countries in the Convention that all 
the CEE countries see the USA and NATO as the best guarantees of their security. But the 
threat assessment arising from various international risks (i.e. “hard” or “soft” security threats) 
varies significantly across the region. For the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary, 
7 A term used by the authors of „The Economist“ 
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the perception of external threats is much less intense than that of the Baltic states or Poland, 
and most likely also for Romania and Bulgaria after their accession. For this reason it is easy to 
understand that the perceived importance for hard security in the Baltic region (including Poland) 
is much stronger than in Central Europe.  
 
For the Baltic states (or Balts) this has to do with their complicated relationship with Russia that 
is still perceived as a threat for various reasons. Here brief mention may be made of recent moves 
towards authoritarianism, Russia’s self-appointment as advocate of the rights of Russian 
minorities in Estonia and Latvia, economic and political pressure or soft security threats such as 
environmental hazards or trans-border crime. The recent developments show very little evidence 
that the EU could at the moment provide the Balts with strong leverage on Russia.  Firstly, there 
is no consistent EU policy towards Russia and Putin deals with the major EU players separately. 
Often, some EU leaders even initiate these separate dealings, as a summit in March 2004 of 
France, Germany, Spain and Russia summoned by Mr Chirac demonstrates. Secondly, the 
perceptions on how to deal with Russia between the old-EU member states and the Baltic 
countries often diverge, a topic that will be treated in more detail in the next section. The old 
member states, and the big players in particular, hardly ever share the Balts’ fears and concerns of 
Russia as a suspicious neighbour not to be trusted. Thirdly, the Balts do not have enough 
international weight to deal with Russia on their own – for Putin they are simply not partners. So 
they have to look to other states to get them on board when dealing with the Russian 
government. In this respect, from the Baltic perspective the US at the moment is seen to be a 
more reliable partner than the EU. Consequently, the Baltic states rely more on the US than on 
the EU in dealing with Russia. Unless EU policy towards Russia changes considerably in the 
coming years, one may expect an enduring Atlanticism in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.  
 
The Russian question also plays a key role in Polish Atlanticism as well. A long-term motivation 
for Polish support of US military presence in Europe has been to counterbalance the Russian 
influence in the region and also because of the historical experience of Poles being sandwiched 
between the competing ambitions of Germany and Russia.  
 
The strong Atlanticism in the Baltic countries and Poland compared to the other Central 
European counterparts might be explained by regional geopolitics as well. The Baltic Sea region, 
which includes some older member states, such as Denmark, Finland and Sweden, can certainly 
be considered as inclined to align more closely with the US rather than with France and Germany  
(representing “autonomism” as a counter concept to “Atlanticism”) on many foreign policy and 
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security issues. Denmark might be taken as a prime example, being a member of NATO but 
having an opt-out from ESDP and not having participated in the West European Union. 
Denmark also strongly supported the accession of the Baltic states into NATO.8 Although 
Finland and Sweden might adopt a low profile due to their non-alignment, it seems that both 
countries realize the importance of NATO for security in the region and most especially in the 
cases of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Given the very good relations between the Scandinavian 
and Baltic neighbours, strong Atlanticism is likely to prevail in the whole Baltic Sea region.  
 
The Baltic states and Poland, unlike their Central European counterparts, border on potentially 
much more unstable and vulnerable regions and states, such as authoritarian and unpredictable 
Belarus, (and to some extent still the Ukraine); and in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania – the 
Black Sea region or Western Balkans. For countries that are exposed to these unstable regions, it 
is understandable that they prefer closer alignment with the US who is seen as the most reliable 
source of “hard security”. As long as the EU does not demonstrate a firm commitment to 
engaging (militarily if necessary) in the so-called “EU close neighbourhood,” these countries will 
probably prefer to keep a closer dialogue with Washington rather than relying on the EU’s rather 
toothless foreign policy. Consequently, very much will depend on how actively the enlarged EU 
is willing to be involved in its close neighbourhood through policies such as ENP (European 
Neighbourhood Policy) and to what extent it will be able to deploy its soft as well as possibly 
hard power to stabilise the regions surrounding it.  
 
3.2  Political elites and Atlanticism 
The other point that has to be acknowledged in connection with the presumed Atlanticism of the 
new EU member states is that much will depend on the political constellation in the individual 
countries, namely the composition of the respective governments. In the CEE region there are 
countries, notably Poland and the Baltic states, where the pro-US orientation will not be 
questioned politically, at least not for the time being, regardless of who is in power. But looking 
at the other Central European countries (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia), 
the picture may change from government to government. A good illustration of this 
phenomenon is the case of the Czech Republic during the Iraq crisis, which witnessed deep 
political divisions across the political spectrum as to how to respond to the proposed military 
strike and to what extent to engage in the US-led “coalition of the willing”, but also across the 
major ruling coalition party – the Social Democrats. As a result of complicated intra-
                                                          
8 For further reference see Evaldas Nekrašas: ‘EU enlargement and the Baltic Sea region,’ Swedish Institute of International 
Affairs Conference paper.   
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governmental negotiations the Czech Republic eventually decided not to participate in the Iraqi 
Freedom operation. This decision was heavily criticised by the opposition Civic Democratic Party 
(ODS). It can be assumed that if the ODS were in power during the Iraqi crisis, the position of 
the Czech Republic would have been much more pro-American and thus Atlanticist.  
 
A similar phenomenon could be observed in neighbouring Slovakia. An analysis by the 
Bratislava-based Institute for Public Affairs (IVO),9 drawing on a number of interviews with high 
ranking Slovak politicians, shows that the Iraq crisis marked steep division between very strong 
pro-US support within the governing coalition, while the opposition parties such as SMER 
(centre-left) or the Slovak Communist party were strongly opposed. On the basis of this 
observation, IVO classifies the attitudes of Slovak political elites in terms of their inclination to 
view the US-EU relations into three categories: those in favour of a stronger and more 
independent EU role on the world stage, those who favour the primacy of NATO as a source of 
stability and prefer a balanced partnership between the US and EU, and finally those who would 
prefer to keep a strong bilateral tie with Washington even at a cost of not acting along with the 
other EU member states. As in the case of the Czech Republic, such differences exist not only 
between political parties but also across parties as well.  
 
Hungarian foreign policy and Atlanticism is reputed to be more consistent than that of the Czech 
Republic. This reputation is based on the strong co-ordinating role of the Prime Minister on 
issues regarding external relations and relatively high levels of apathy among the general public 
toward foreign policy issues. Nonetheless, the domestic political constellation has had an impact 
on the consistency of Hungary’s Atlanticism. FIDESZ, although largely Atlanticist and a 
dominant right-wing party, has used in the past a more anti-American rhetoric than one would 
have expected, in its goal to attract more nationalist voters. This “nationalist” strategy is similar to 
Václav Klaus’s opposition in the Czech Republic to the US strike on Iraq in early 2003.10   
 
In contrast, Poland throughout 1990’s demonstrated long-lasting and consistent support for US 
foreign policy over many issues, starting with the First Gulf War, Kosovo air campaign, 
Afghanistan and later Iraq. This attitude was never questioned by Polish political elites,11 a 
situation that differs markedly with the political elites of the Czech Republic (over military 
actions in Kosovo and Iraq). Poland’s pro-US stance remained constant despite the fact that the 
                                                          
9 Šťastný, Gábelová: ‘Transatlantic Relations as seen by politicians in Slovakia’, Institute for Public Affairs, 2004.   
10 Significantly, his opinion was not consistent with the party he used to chair (Civic Democratic Party, ODS).   
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political scene had changed frequently during this period. And there is another explanation why 
Atlanticism is so deeply enshrined in the thinking of Polish political elites – the strong Polish 
diaspora in the US plays a very important role in lobbying Polish interests with US 
administrations. On the contrary, in the Czech Republic, Slovakia or Hungary relations with the 
US (and foreign policy in general) play a very minor role in general elections.  
 
In Latvia and Estonia the pro-American (and, at the same time, anti- Russian) political consensus 
is quite robust across existing party lines. The one factor, which might change this in the future, 
is a greater enfranchisement and mobilisation of Russian speaking minorities. Thus in countries 
where the broad political consensus on an Atlanticist orientation in foreign policy is weaker, 
political actors in those countries can just use the fact they are in opposition as leverage on the 
ruling government, without this position having necessarily to reflect their long-term strategies on 
the desirability of siding with either the EU or the US.  
 
It is possible to argue that the Iraq crisis was such a specific case of a transatlantic rift that it is 
not possible to draw general conclusions on the assumed “Atlanticism” of the political actors in 
CEE countries on the basis of their attitude to this issue.12 Furthermore during the Iraq crisis, the 
new member states were in the final stages of accession into the EU, and were thus not eligible to 
vote or take part in the deliberations.13 This enabled them to take a slightly more independent 
approach, and their stances perhaps can even be perceived as a “revenge” for not being admitted 
to the deliberations at an earlier stage.14
                                                          
 This situation was a unique one and is not a reliable 
indicator of future behaviour.   
 
However, the new member states have been instrumental in repairing the recent transatlantic rift 
over Iraq. The fact that Washington now understands that there are more friendly countries in 
the EU might lead the US administration to adopt a more open approach to the EU as such. This 
was clearly demonstrated during the visit of George Bush to Europe in February 2005. The 
highlight of his journey was the Bratislava summit with Putin. Significantly, even in Brussels, it 
was Slovak Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda who spoke for Europe with regard to Iraq. This can 
11 Although some experts tend to point out that some political parties have started to challenge the traditional bases of Polish 
foreign policy, including the strongly pro-Atlanticist orientation: e.g. Lepper´s Samoobrona (Self-Defence) Party.  See, M. 
Zaborowski: “Poland - What Kind of an EU Member?” in Reshuffling the European Chessboard.   Institute for Public Affairs, 2004.   
12 The analysis of IVO noted earlier shows that even representatives of parties who otherwise tend to favour a pro-US policy 
strongly contested the legitimacy of the action.  Note for example ANO (J. Banáš, K. Glončáková-Golev), the Christian 
Democratic KDH party (V. Palko) and the HZDS (Sergej Kozlík).   
13 The participation of the accession countries in the deliberations of the EU bodies happened only after signing the Accession 
Treaty on 16 April 2003.   
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also be viewed as a sign of understanding among the older EU members that the good relations 
of Central European states with Washington might work to the benefit of the EU. But once the 
CEE countries are members of the EU, depending on domestic political constellations, their 
positions in the Council regarding issues where relations with the US are at stake might differ, 
depending on who is in power. This situation might be similar to that of Spain immediately after 
the March 2004 elections, when there was a U-turn in the attitude of the new government on 
Iraq. Consequently, a country that was one of the strongest supporters of US military action 
decided almost overnight to pull out of Iraq.  
 
Support of US policies, especially if they are viewed to be somewhat controversial from the 
European (i.e. EU) perspective, may not emerge just because the United States is viewed as the 
primary guarantee of CEE security. The countries in the region do expect the United States to 
offer something in return, exactly because sometimes they opt for policies that are not always 
popular with their respective electorates or with the other EU leaders. The most frequently 
articulated issue over the last year or so has been the inclusion of the new member states in the 
visa waiver programme which would enable the citizens of Central and Eastern European 
countries to travel to the US for a period of up to three months without visas.  At the moment, 
only Slovenia enjoys this status. The visa waiver programme contains a number of conditions 
that all new EU member states fulfil – with the exception of a refusal rate that is not supposed to 
exceed 3%. The argument of most of the governments in the region is that with EU 
membership, the CEE countries do not pose significant security concerns for the US 
administration in terms of possible large-scale trans-Atlantic migration. Moreover, the move is 
seen largely in symbolic terms as the minimum that the United States could do in return for the 
CEE allies strong supporting on the Iraq issue.  
 
But their efforts are not likely to be successful in the short-term. Inclusion in the list of countries 
to which the visa waiver programme applies would require a change in legislation by Congress.  
This would be difficult, not least because of increased concerns over national security among 
both Democrats and Republicans. There were even proposals to abolish the visa waiver 
programme completely, reintroducing visas for all the countries currently on the list.15 The issue 
was touched on during the visit of George Bush to Bratislava in February 2005 but his message 
                                                          
14 The accession countries were not invited to join the European Council meeting on 28 February 2003 that adopted a common 
position on Iraq.   It was decided that the accession countries would be immediately informed on the conclusions after the 
summit.    
15 This idea was eventually turned down.   However, citizens of countries participating in the visa waiver programme will in the 
future have to carry passports containing biometric data.   
 15
was rather ambiguous with uncertain promises being made. Nonetheless, it is clear that the 
governments in Central Europe will continue to raise this question in bilateral relations with the 
US.16
                                                          
 If the United States resists embarking on a road toward lifting the visas, such US 
intransigence might lead to a cooling of bilateral relations with Washington and less enthusiastic 
support for its policies.  Moreover, the new member states might – if they feel their voice is not 
heard – try to use the EU as leverage to achieve a change of policy in Washington in this 
respect.17  
 
3.3  Public opinion and Atlanticism  
Another point that ought to be considered in connection with the Atlanticism of the EU 
newcomers in CFSP is public opinion in these countries. In all of the accession states, in relation 
to Iraq, an overwhelming majority of the populations in the region opposed military intervention 
in Iraq. But Iraq is not the only example. The recent Transatlantic Trends Survey published by 
the German Marshall Fund of the United States shows that in many ways, the new member states 
are not necessarily more Atlanticist than the old members. Although the last year survey (2004) 
included only Poland and Slovakia from the group of the new member countries, it can still 
provide very useful guidance on attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe in general.18  
 
16 The issue was for instance discussed during the visit of Marek Belka (Polish Prime Minister) in Prague in September 2004 
where he agreed with the Czech Premier Stanislav Gross that they would coordinate their efforts to achieve the ultimate goal of 
lifting US visa for the citizens of Poland and the Czech Republic.    
17 This provision is already included in the so-called Hague programme for Freedom, Security and Justice, highlighting the future 
agenda for policy concerning visas, asylum, immigration and internal security in the EU.   
18 Transatlantic Trends is comprehensive survey of American and European public opinion.  Polling was conducted in the United 
States, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and the United Kingdom and, for the first time, Slovakia, 
Spain, and Turkey.  The survey is a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, 
with additional support from the Luso-American Foundation, Fundacion BBVA, and the Institute for Public Affairs (IVO).   
Findings and further analysis are available at www.transatlantictrends.org  
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    Source: Transatlantic Trends Survey 2004.   
 
For instance in the thermometer readings, it shows that the “warmth” of feeling towards the US 
in Poland is 56˚, but still lower than for instance in the UK (62˚) or Italy (61˚). Moreover for 
Poland this figure represents a decline of five points since 2003.19
                                                          
 On the contrary, Slovakia (50˚) 
can be found at the very opposite end of the spectrum, with only Turkey (28˚) and Spain (42˚) 
exhibiting significantly lower degrees of sympathy towards the United States. On the other hand, 
looking at sympathy towards the EU, Slovakia ranks much higher with a score of 72˚ (even 
higher than France) and Poland with 65˚. Therefore the Polish public feels (9 points) warmer 
toward the EU than the US. An Atlanticist index, developed from the Transatlantic survey places 
Poland in the middle of the countries surveyed, with a score of 47 which is lower than Germany 
(53), Italy (57), UK (58) or the Netherlands (60), while Slovakia is at the bottom of the table with 
a score of 37.20 
 
19 A special type of survey question that measures the attitudes of citizens  in selected countries towards the US and EU using the 
convenient and easily understandable format of a thermometer reading.   
20 Ronald Asmus, Philip P. Everts, Pierangelo Isernia: “Across the Atlantic and the Political Aisle: The Double Divide in US-
European Relations”.   “The Atlanticist Index” was based on questions such as the sympathy to the US, desirability of the US 
global leadership, NATO´s essentiality, the share of common values between the US and EU or the importance of having allies 
when acting militarily Published by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2004.  More information is available at www.  
gmfus.org  
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 Source: Asmus, Everst, Insernia: “Across the Atlantic and the Political Aisle: The Double Divide in US-European Relations”.  2004 
 
According to a similar survey undertaken in the Czech Republic by the STEM agency (December 
2001), 75% of Czech population was in favour of coordinating Czech foreign policy with the EU. 
Coordination with US foreign policy was favoured by 37% of respondents. Moreover, when 
answers to these survey questions were combined a majority (over 50%) of the public regarded 
Czech foreign policy as following the right direction because there was no blanket decision of 
coordinating with the US.21 
 
To look at the public opinion in the region more broadly, use can also be made of the latest 
Eurobarometer survey, undertaken in October/November 2004.22 Examining public perceptions 
of the United States in promoting world peace and stability, the survey shows that only three 
countries out of the 30 surveyed view the role of the US positively, all of them being new 
member states or accession countries: the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Romania. A similar 
scenario would apply to perceptions of the US in the global fight against terrorism. While a 
majority of the public of the new member states view the US role positively, there is in contrast a 
negative view of the US among a majority of the publics in most of the EU-15 member states 
with the exception of those belonging to the traditional supporters of US policy, i.e. the UK and 
the Netherlands. The role of the EU in promoting peace in the world and the fight against 
terrorism is viewed most positively by Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which show 
the highest positive assessments in the EU.  Most of the other newcomers are scattered around 
                                                          
21 See, Věra Řiháčková: ‘Czech Republic: Europeanisation of a hesitant Atlanticist?’ EUROPEUM, Prague, 2005. 
22 http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb62/eb62firsten.pdf.  This is one of the most recent comprehensive 
bi-annual surveys of various EU-related issues, undertaken in 25 EU member states as well as candidate countries.   
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EU average, with only Poland viewing the positive role of the EU in these domains rather 
sceptically.  
 
On the other hand, this Eurobarometer survey also suggests that the populations of the new 
member states are much more receptive to the idea of having a genuine CFSP. Public support for 
CFSP is strongest in Slovenia (81%), Poland (78%) and Slovakia (75%), but also in the Baltic 
states it is above the EU average (Latvia and Lithuania at 71%, Estonia at 70%, the EU average 
being 69%). Only Hungary and the Czech Republic demonstrate less enthusiasm for a genuine 
CFSP, with 69% and 59% in favour respectively. The picture becomes more mixed when an 
examination is made of attitudes towards European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). An 
interesting observation is that all the new member states are overwhelmingly in support of 
ESDP, as opposed to some of the old member states, with support ranging between 88% in 
Slovenia to 84% in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Estonia, with only Lithuania exhibiting a 
lower level of support (but still quite high at 81%, i.e. at the same level as France).  
 
One has to be cautious in interpreting these findings for two reasons. First, the high level of 
support in the CEE region might also result from a lower level of familiarity with what 
CFSP/ESDP actually entail, including for example a more complicated relationship with NATO 
or with the United States, or the necessity for increasing defence spending, or the willingness to 
engage militarily beyond EU borders. Secondly, it is questionable to what extent public opinion is 
really shaping government stances in foreign policy. Over the past few years, mass surveys have 
shown large support amongst EU citizens for a genuine CFSP, and yet the member states have 
not been able to move forward significantly on this issue. More generally, national governments 
are rarely under strong electoral scrutiny with regard to foreign policy issues. In fact, the example 
of Iraq shows that the governments of countries such as Italy or Spain adopted very firm pro-
American positions, despite strong opposition within public opinion.23 Therefore the fact that 
public opinion in Central and Eastern Europe might not be more Atlanticist than in old EU-15 
does not necessarily exclude the fact that the governments in the region will keep a stronger pro-
US profile.  
 
To summarise the discussed observations, the presumed Atlanticism of the new member states is 
likely to bear two main consequences in the near future. First, most CEE governments will try in 
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the foreseeable future to ensure that the EU and the US act together on the most important 
issues in international relations. Second, the degree of their willingness to support the US in 
situations where there are divergent opinions with the EU will vary across the region, as it varies 
within the EU-15. Poland is likely to remain the most committed Atlanticist, along with the Baltic 
countries. The smaller Central European countries such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary and Slovenia, are likely voice their support for US policies more cautiously, giving 
greater regard to the opinion of the major EU players.  
 
4.  Geographical priorities in the activity of the new member states 
The area in which we might expect to see the most diverging stances of the new member states 
vis-à-vis CFSP is arguably the geographic focus in which these countries would like the EU 
foreign policy to evolve most. EU foreign policy is obviously a complex phenomenon, with many 
different countries pushing for privileged relations or close engagement of the EU in various 
parts of the world. It can be argued that each enlargement brought about a new dimension to the 
external action of the EU – the accession of the UK brought closer ties with the Commonwealth 
countries, Spanish and Portuguese accession increased the focus on Latin America, and the 
accession of Finland and Sweden fostered a Nordic dimension. With the entry of countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe, it was assumed that these countries would push the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy eastwards.  But the term “East” in itself does not say much. It is not 
any precisely defined area, and it would be more accurate to describe the goals of the newcomers 
as wishing to develop a consistent EU policy towards neighbours who are outside the EU, 
especially those in the East as opposed to the neighbours at the southern shore of the 
Mediterranean.  
 
The focus on neighbours is understandable for several reasons. Firstly, none of the newcomers 
have more “global” aspirations with the possible exception of Poland, whose control of one of 
the occupation sectors in Iraq can be considered as a sign of stronger foreign policy ambitions. 
But even Poland can at the very best aspire to be a regional leader but hardly ever it behaves as 
such, it does not aspire to become a regional speaker on issues such as the Middle East peace 
process (arguably it does so on other issues such as Ukraine). Moreover, the regional leadership 
of Poland is strongly contested in neighbouring countries, especially in the Czech Republic and 
                                                          
 
23 This is not to suggest that the foreign policy positions of a government have no electoral consequences.  It is undoubtedly true 
that the Iraq issue played at least some part in general elections in Spain (March 2004) and the UK (May 2005) and in the April 
2005 regional elections in Italy.  Only in Denmark did the incumbent pro-US government not suffer electorally because of an 
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Hungary. Secondly, all of the newcomers, again with the exception of Poland, are relatively small 
countries, a fact that obviously influences their foreign policy goals. During the transition to 
democracy, apart from the primary goals of joining the EU and NATO, the foreign policies of 
these countries were focused mostly on achieving and sustaining friendly relations with their 
neighbours. With membership of the EU, the CEE “neighbourhood” remains the main focal 
point but the focus shifts to countries remaining outside the EU. And precisely because the CEE 
countries are rather small, acting through the EU becomes a very convenient tool for these 
countries to achieve their goals.  There is the hope that the 2004 accession states expertise with 
the EU’s new neighbours (being “old” neighbours for CEE countries) will be acknowledged by 
the other EU partners and they will be allowed to take the initiative and give a new impetus to 
pre-existing relations between the EU and these countries.  
 
In this respect one important point has to be borne in mind. There are many new neighbours and 
they constitute a rather heterogeneous group. They stretch from Russia in the North (although 
Russia is stricto sensu not a new neighbour due to the previous Finish accession, but the inclusion 
of the Baltics certainly gives EU-Russian relations a different dimension) to Croatia and Serbia 
and Montenegro in the South. These new neighbours are very different in many respects: they 
include countries that will soon join the EU such as Romania or those who are expected to join 
at a later stage, e.g. Croatia. They also include countries whose eventual accession is beyond 
doubt, at least politically, such as Serbia and other Western Balkan countries.24 But the group also 
includes the Ukraine where recent developments shed some more optimism and the EU will 
soon have to tackle the issue of how to respond to European aspirations within the Ukraine.  
Belarus is a particular case in that relations between the EU and this failed state are practically 
frozen and nothing much can be achieved as long as Lukashenko stays in power. Finally, Russia 
is a very special case in many respects, not least because of its size, economic importance and the 
fact that it is still – if not a superpower – at least a very important actor on the world stage.  
 
Thus, the diversity of the EU’s new neighbours implies that it would be very difficult for the new 
member states to agree on how third states should be prioritised in terms of CFSP. Such diversity 
makes it difficult for CEE member states to propose a convincing plan to its EU partners for 
dealing with these new neighbours.  
 
                                                          
unpopular stance on the Iraq issue.  However, all of these electoral outcomes can be most appropriately explained in terms of 
domestic political factors.  
24 But the future of EU enlargement is strongly contested in some member states, not least in France which will hold a 
referendum on any enlargement, taking place after 2007.    
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4.1  Russia – will the Balts be able to prompt a common EU voice?  
As has been already suggested, Russia represents a very special case in relation to the EU. Not 
only is it by far the largest neighbour of the EU, it is economically and arguably strategically the 
EU’s most important regional partner. It is quite evident that there is at present no common EU 
stance as to how to deal with Russia. On the contrary, it seems that the EU’s dealings with Russia 
are a sum of bilateral diplomacies rather than a consistent front. A few recent examples where 
certain old EU member states (France, Germany and Italy) took very specific and independent 
positions vis-à-vis Russia underscore this point. At times it seems as if some of the old-EU 
leaders were competing for Putin’s attention. Perhaps the most striking example is that of 
Berlusconi when during the Italian Presidency in 2003 he openly spoke in favour of Russia 
joining the EU or showing understanding for the tough stance of Putin on Chechnya. The 
question remains whether there is any real substance behind these gestures. However it is 
certainly the case that many of the EU-15 member states’ relations with Russia lack strong 
tensions and they do not want to see a hardline approach that some of the new members would 
like the EU to adopt.  
 
Looking at how to deal with Russia from the perspectives of the new member states, there is no 
doubt that this is a number one issue for the Balts and very important for Poland as well. Russia 
still poses a risk for the Balts in various respects – ranging from cultural pressure to geopolitical, 
economic and political threats. The cultural pressure stems mainly from a continuous raising of 
the question of Russian minorities in the Baltic states at various fora, including OSCE or EU-
Russia summits. This is particularly sensitive in the case of Latvia where the Russian speaking 
minority constitutes close to 40% of the total population,25 and in the past there has been 
pressure from Russia to turn Latvia into a bi-communal state. Estonia has a large Russian 
speaking population as well (28%),26 which leaves Lithuania the only Baltic state where the 
Russian minority is not a contentious issue in bilateral relations.   
 
But there is some strong evidence that Russia is exerting economic and political pressure on the 
Baltics. All the Baltic states are heavily dependent on Russian energy supplies, as well as on the 
willingness of Russia to pay for transit costs through Baltic pipelines.27 There is a strong fear of 
                                                          
25 According to CIA world fact book, the Russian proportion of Latvian population was 29.6 % in April 2005.   But a distinction 
has to be made between those who claim Russian nationality in surveys and the overall number of Russian speakers (including 
migrants from other parts of ex-USSR).   Were this figure to be used the total number of Russians in Latvia would increase to 
40%. 
26 Ibid.   
 
27 For example, Russia stopped shipping oil through the terminal in the Latvian port of Ventspils allegedly claiming that the 
operating company (Ventspils nafta) was charging fees at “uneconomic” levels.  Some analysts believe this was a way of exerting 
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the extent to which Russia can influence politics in the three countries, through use of 
intelligence, blackmail and espionage, as demonstrated by the impeachment of former Lithuanian 
President Rolandas Paksas in April 2004 for alleged links with Russian organized crime and secret 
services.  
 
Apart from these issues, there is a worrying uncertainty over the borders with Russia. Lithuania 
until recently remained the only country in the Baltics that has signed a border treaty with Russia, 
although it is still awaiting ratification by the Duma (the Russian parliament). Estonia followed 
suit only in May 2005. Although the ratification was awaited in Duma in course of this year, 
Russia withdrew its signature from the Treaty. Such a move followed the decision of the 
Estonian parliament to attach a preamble to the ratification act, claiming the legal continuity of 
the Estonian state with the period preceding the Soviet occupation of Estonia, thus disputing the 
current border demarcation (although without legal effect). There is no agreed border treaty 
between Russia and Latvia. The border question is understandably one of the issues that make 
the Baltic countries suspicious of Russia’s intentions, an idea until recently fostered by very 
strong Russian opposition to NATO’s enlargement to include these three Baltic states.  
 
The situation has certainly changed after the twin “accession” of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to 
NATO and the EU in 2004 and it is clear that Russia is now perceived to be a less imminent 
threat. But there is a certain frustration among the Baltic leaders arising from the inability of the 
EU to speak with one voice to Russia and address the enduring concerns of the Balts over both 
internal developments within Russia as well as with what can be seen as revived Russian 
imperialism.  
 
This has been demonstrated on several occasions where the three Baltic states have tried to guide 
the EU´s attention to issues concerning Russia. Salient examples include the “Rose Revolution” 
in Georgia, the “Orange Revolution” in the Ukraine, Putin’s dealings with Chechnya or criticism 
of Russia’s reversion to authoritarianism after the Beslan attacks. However, the Balts were not 
very successful in convincing their EU counterparts that a tough line had to be taken on Russia 
on these issues. This is due to several factors.  Firstly, the Baltic republics are newcomers and 
small states, therefore they carry relatively little weight in the formulation of EU foreign policy. 
Secondly, they are still weakly represented in key EU institutions dealing with EU foreign policy 
– namely in the Council secretariat and the Commission where they do not hold any top posts 
                                                          
pressure to sell the remaining shares (not already in Russian hands) in the company to Russian buyers (Source: Financial Times, 
20 February 2005).   
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(apart from the respective Commissioners or members of cabinet).28 Thirdly, as was highlighted 
earlier, many old EU member states hold particular relations with Russia that they are unlikely to 
sacrifice for the sake of intimidating Russia through automatically accepting the Balts’ arguments.   
 
But it can be expected that the Balts with the support of the Poles will continue to raise the 
Russian card in the EU, in which they are also likely to be joined by some of the countries in EU-
15 who prefer a hard-line approach to Russia, such as the Netherlands and the Scandinavian 
countries. Although it might be difficult for the Balts to shape the common position in the 
Council or to influence the Commission agenda, one body that they can use as leverage in this 
respect is the European Parliament (EP). Here we could witness a strong activism of Baltic and 
Polish MEPs on issues relating not only to Russia but on other issues that have direct 
implications on EU-Russian relations, such as Georgia or the Ukraine. The deliberation on the 
report of EU-Russian relations, tabled before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the EP by Cecilia 
Malmström in April 2005, shows a large number of amending proposals made by Baltic and 
Polish MEPs who are attempting to give the report a much tougher line than is evident in the 
draft.29  
 
One of the points that occupy the minds of the Baltic leaders is that Russia should admit 
responsibility for the events following the liberation of Eastern Europe from Nazism, leading to 
a forceful occupation of the region by Stalin. In this they have been joined by the demands from 
Poland for Russia to admit some responsibility for the Molotov – Ribbentrop pact of 1939. For 
this reason, the Presidents of Lithuania and Estonia refused a Russian invitation to mark the 
Sixtieth anniversary of the end of WWII in Moscow on May 9, 2005, although the President of 
Latvia, Vaira Vike-Freiberga accepted. But Vike-Freiberga during an official visit to Sweden 
underlined that although she agreed to join the aforesaid celebration in Moscow, she still believed 
a re-evaluation of the post-WWII era by Russia was necessary. It is also quite interesting to see 
what tactics Putin used in this respect – in order to lure the Baltic leaders to attend the 
anniversary, he implicitly promised that the border treaties that Latvia and Estonia desire could 
have been signed in May 2005. Such implicit promises came to nothing.  
 
However it is important not to portray Baltic interests as being so clear-cut in nature. It must be 
acknowledged that the three Baltic states do not have the same priorities and goals in relation to 
Russia and in fact there is not much co-ordination among them. Lithuania has probably best 
                                                          
28 ‘Evident’ cisis in EU-Russia relations in Rzeczpospolita, retrieved from http://www.gateway2russia.com/st/art_275177.php 
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managed to tackle bilateral relations with Russia.30  The mutual relations between Moscow and 
Vilnius embrace fewer points of conflict emanating from their mutual history. Their mutual 
border was recognized at a relatively early stage and a treaty was signed in 1997 (albeit not 
ratified). Furthermore, the absence of a huge Russian minority takes some tensions off bilateral 
relations between the two capitals. Thus, the most controversial issue has been the settlement of 
the status of the Kaliningrad exclave where Lithuania is the principal transit corridor for travel 
between mainland Russia and the Kaliningrad oblast. While this issue was dealt with mainly 
through the EU, Lithuania could hide behind various Commission reservations. It was the 
Commission in fact, who refused to contemplate the idea of retaining a visa free regime, or a 
transit corridor, through Lithuanian territory – an idea Russia favoured.31   
 
Estonian politicians seem to keep a rather low profile in relation to its Eastern neighbour, and it 
seems as if political representatives are a bit afraid of intimidating Russia. Recently Estonian 
Prime Minister Juhan Parts rebuked Latvia for its outspoken criticism of Russia because such 
criticism was viewed as being potentially damaging to Baltic-Russian relations.32 On the other 
hand, the decision of the Estonian Parliament to attached the aforesaid preamble during the 
ratification of Russian-Estonian border treaty speaks for the opposite – this was a purely 
symbolic gesture without any practical effect, and speaks for the belief that Russia would 
eventually give up, perhaps issuing a similar clause during the ratification in Duma.  Perhaps the 
strongest Estonian voices in relation to Russia may come from the European Parliament from 
MEPs such as ex-foreign minister Toomas Hendrik Ilves.  
 
Latvia remains the most vicious of the Baltic states from the Russian perspective. And it is at the 
moment pushing the hardest to get the EU to recognize Soviet aggression against the Baltic 
states after WWII and to make the EU speak to Russia with one voice.  In this respect, Latvia has 
been partially successful – it secured the support of Tony Blair and George Bush. The latter 
spoke in favour of the Baltic states position at the NATO summit in February 2005. In addition, 
the stopover of George Bush in Riga on his way to Moscow for the Sixtieth anniversary of the 
Allied victory over Nazism was an important diplomatic success for Latvia. On the other hand, it 
                                                          
29 See the draft report at http://www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/PR/560/560592/560592en. pdf and 
amending proposals at http://www.europarl.eu. int/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/AM/562/562208/562208en. pdf 
30 See “Bearish”- City Paper interview with Edward Lucas, the Economist´s correspondent in Moscow.    
31 The issue of transit through Kaliningrad was finally settled in November 2002 by the EU-Russia agreement on the so-called 
Facilitated Travel Document (FTD) for multiple or single entry visa or Facilitated Rail Travel Document (FRTD) for single 
journey by train, issued by the Lithuanian consulate.  Another problem was that a lot of the Kaliningrad region residents were not 
in a possession of an international Russian passport but only an internal one.  For this reason, a transitional period was agreed 
allowing the Lithuanian authorities to issue FTD on the basis of internal Russian passports until December 2004.    
32 Ahto Lobjakas: Baltics: ‘Latvia Spearheads Effort to Force Russia to Confront Its Past,’ RFE/RL, 2005. 
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underlines the thesis that when the Baltic states (and in this case particularly Latvia) do not feel 
their voice is being listened to in Brussels, they turn to Washington where they are more likely to 
be successful – and this again illustrates the Atlanticist inclination of these countries.   
 
Although Poland does not have such strong concerns regarding Russia as the Balts, Polish 
leaders still see Russia as a risk. This perception is based less on Russia’s internal political and 
economic activities and more on renewed imperialist tendencies of Russia in treating its 
neighbours. Undoubtedly both factors are linked. Consequently, Poland wants for mainly 
geopolitical reasons to get as many countries out of the Russian sphere of influence as possible 
through promotion of the benefits of a pro-Western and pro-European orientation. That is why 
Poland is also supportive of the EU’s new neighbourhood policy and calls for recognition of the 
choice of countries that chose to follow the lead of the EU. The ultimate aim is, however, to 
minimise Russian influence on Polish affairs.  
 
It is beyond doubt that it will be very difficult to build a genuine common EU stance on Russia 
in the near future, despite the fact that it would benefit the Balts very much as their capacity to 
have an influence within the CFSP framework will grow the longer they are members of the EU.  
But the recent shift to realpolitik where the bigger states ostentatiously ignore their EU partners 
and pursue their self-interest is unfortunately very likely to apply to EU-Russian relations, 
perhaps more than to any other region. It cannot be expected that Russia will be too enthusiastic 
about the emergence of any significant pro-active EU presence along its borders – the status quo is 
extremely convenient for Russian politicians as it enables them to play EU members against each 
other and this gives them a much stronger negotiating role than they would have otherwise.  
 
But it is also possible that we might witness the Baltic states pushing the EU to engage more 
closely in other parts of the former Soviet Union, namely in the Caucasus, Ukraine and Moldova. 
Firstly, this is because of the deep-rooted conviction that the other former “brotherly nations” 
have the right to opt out of the Russian sphere of influence and chose a pro-European path just 
as the Balts did.  Secondly, there are pragmatic reasons, where the Balts favour more opposition 
to Russia’s pervasive influence. This stance is underlined by the fact that many of the old-EU 
states are not ready to view Russia as interfering with the internal business of small neighbouring 
countries. Thus it makes perfect sense for the Baltic countries and Poland to encourage a more 
pro-Western stance among Russia’s small neighbours. Ideally these small states would eventually 
join the EU. 
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4.2  Poland – paving the way for the Ukraine to join the EU?  
Even before Polish accession to the EU, it was obvious that the Ukraine is a priority country for 
Warsaw. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was very active in the formulation of its position 
on how the EU should deal with the Ukraine after the 2004 enlargement. In January 2003 it 
circulated its own vision of the new neighbourhood policy in a non-paper (i.e. discussion paper). 
This document brought forward a number of broad as well as concrete proposals, including, inter 
alia, 
                                                          
the establishment of a European Democracy Fund enabling NGOs to implement EU-
funded projects, strengthening democracy and the rule of law in neighbouring countries or use of 
the European Investment Fund to help the SMEs in the region. Although the non-paper does 
not refer specifically to the Ukraine but covers other countries such as Moldova or Belarus, it 
makes special recommendations such as EU recognition of the “European choice”. Furthermore 
it advocates that the existing Partnership and Co-operation agreement should be upgraded to a 
standard association agreement.  
 
Apart from long-standing historical, social, political and economic links between the two 
countries, there seems to be an overwhelming political consensus in Poland that the Ukraine 
should be given the right to join the EU. Prior to the European Parliament elections in June 
2004, none of the eight major political parties in Poland opposed the European aspirations of 
Ukraine, including the two populist parties that are sceptical about the EU – Self-defence 
(Samoobrona) and the League of Polish Families. According to the League, the Ukraine would be 
a natural ally of Poland in the EU and would obviously increase its weight in the club.33  
 
The positions of the main Polish political parties show that there are at least two reasons why 
Poland should strive for the EU accession ambitions of the Ukraine to be recognized. Firstly 
Poland generally sees its role as pushing the EU neighbourhood policy to the East rather than to 
the South. The argument here is that there has to be a clear differentiation between the southern 
neighbours of the EU (i.e. Mediterranean countries of the southern shore) who are not European 
and recognition that Eastern neighbouring countries are European. Some political parties, most 
notably the Law and Justice party, even believe that the Ukraine rather than Russia should be the 
main focus of the European neighbourhood policy34. The second argument in favour of the 
Ukraine has to do with geopolitics – the Ukraine is seen as a buffer between Poland and Russia 
that is important because of a deep-rooted perception that Russia is a potential threat. If the right 
33 Taras Kuzio: ‘Poland lobbies EU for Ukraine’, Eurasian Daily Monitor, 2004.   
34 Russia, however, is stricto sensu not part of the European Neighbourhood Policy, although some of its instruments (e.g. the New 
Neighbourhood Instrument to become one EU financial instrument for the neighbouring countries) will be applicable to Russia 
as well  
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of the Ukraine to join the EU is not recognized, there is a risk that it will tighten its relations with 
Russia and will remain in its “sphere of influence”.   
 
The willingness of Poland to retain “special” relations with Ukraine was self-evident even in the 
period of the run-up to accession. Poland strongly lobbied the European Commission to retain a 
visa-free regime for Ukraine and later to impose visas on Ukrainian citizens only at the date of 
accession. It should be noted in this respect that the Czech Republic and Slovakia had introduced 
such visa regulations as early as 2000. In the end, Poland agreed to introduce visas for Ukrainian 
citizens six months prior to accession. However, Poland managed to extract some important 
concessions from the Ukraine. Poland undertook to issue free visas to Ukranian applicants and in 
return the Ukrainian government agreed to retain a visa free regime for Polish citizens. This issue 
demonstrates how important bilateral relations with Ukraine are for Poland – for other former 
CIS countries such as Russia and Belarus visas were introduced at an earlier stage partially 
because of a failure to conclude re-admission agreements.  
 
Poland was also concerned with the EU not being willing to grant market economy status to the 
Ukraine.35 This, had the practical consequence of setting quotas on steel imports from Ukraine to 
the EU at 185,000 tons in 2004, far below what Poland itself was importing from the Ukraine 
before the accession.36 The Polish focus on the Ukraine was thus strong from the very moment 
of accession. Obviously, the events of December 2004, leading to a re-running of the second 
round of the presidential elections in Ukraine and final victory for the pro-European presidential 
candidate Viktor Yuschenko, gave a completely different dynamic to Polish policy. The 
instrumental role of Poland in dealings with the Ukraine can be demonstrated by the fact that it 
was the Polish President Alexandr Kwasniewski, along with the EU foreign policy chief Solana 
and Lithuanian President Adamkus, who were entrusted by the EU to travel to Kiev after 
negotiations following the first (second round) presidential elections were contested leading to a 
dangerous political deadlock. It shows that EU leaders are able to recognize the leading role of 
Poland.  However, it also shows an apparent lack of interest in the Ukraine among the leaders of 
the EU heavyweights, a situation that contrasts sharply in how these leaders normally deal with 
Russia.  
 
The victory of the strongly pro-reform and pro-EU candidate in the Ukraine obviously shed a 
completely changed the European aspirations of this Eastern European country. Although this 
                                                          
35 The recognition as a market economy is essential for the admittance of a country to World Trade Organisation (WTO).  Russia 
was granted the status of market economy already in 2002. 
 28
issue was in the past played down by many top EU politicians, not least by former Commission 
President Prodi,37 it is clear that it will be very difficult to maintain this rhetoric from now on.  
Interestingly enough, the Ukranian factor was evident in the December 2004 European Council 
decision to launch accession negotiations with Turkey. The point some countries, and notably 
Poland, are making now, is that once we agree that Turkey can become a member of the club, the 
EU cannot possibly say no to Ukraine. This has led to a lack of opposition from Poland to open 
accession negotiations with Turkey. This is because if Ukranian accession were not at a 
consideration, the attitude to eventual Turkish accession would probably be much more reserved 
due to Vatican unhappiness about such a development.  
 
The events of December 2004 showed firstly the reluctance of some old-EU member states to 
give Ukraine a green light immediately, partially because of fears of antagonising Russia. But it 
turns out that Putin might not have a problem with Ukrainian aspirations to join the EU – it 
seems that for Putin Ukrainian membership in NATO is much more problematic.38 Putin 
accepted the Yuschenko victory in the re-run elections in January 2005 without any reservations, 
despite showing indisputable support for Yanukovych ahead of the elections.  
 
The visit of Yuschenko to Brussels in February 2005 did not leave anyone in the EU in doubt 
that for the new Ukrainian president there are no alternatives to the aspiration of full 
membership. Not even the fact that the EU and Ukraine were able to move ahead with 
European Neighbourhood Action Plan quickly. Yuschenko spoke openly of his ambition to start 
accession negotiations in 2007. But again, there is an inter-institutional cleavage: while the 
European Parliament called very openly to acknowledging candidate status for the Ukraine and 
applauding Yuschenko during his speech, the reaction from the Council was much more 
lukewarm. Jean-Claude Juncker as the incoming Council president “warned against offering 
Ukraine the prospect of full membership” (The Times, December 10, 2004). The Commission has 
kept a rather low profile in the debate so far, but it clearly would like to move ahead with the 
Ukraine in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).  
 
What is going to be the future of the Ukrainian card in the EU and how active Poland and 
perhaps some other new member states will be in this process remains to be seen. However, 
recognition of the possible candidate status of the Ukraine now depends on the internal political 
                                                          
36 Ibid.   
37 Prodi was alleged to say that Ukraine “will never become a member of the EU”.   He consequently claimed that the media 
misquoted him.    
38 Taras Kuzio: “Orange Revolution exposes EU´s deficient Ukraine policy”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2004.    
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development in the EU as well as on the progress of the reform process in the Ukraine itself. The 
complications with ratification of the EU Constitutional Treaty in some member states, 
underlined by the recent rejection of the Treaty in France and the Netherlands, will lead the EU 
to rethinking its strategy towards further enlargements (i.e. after Bulgaria and Romania) beyond 
2007. And it is highly unlikely that if the ratification process fails the EU would be willing – at 
least for the time being – to give a green light to Ukrainian wishes to commence negotiations on 
EU membership.   
 
4.3  The Central European countries – pulling South rather than East? 
The geographical focus of the remaining new member states – the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary and Slovenia - is not as clear-cut as in the case of Poland and the Baltic republics. To 
some extent, they are interested in the Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) but not to the same degree as Poland and the Baltic states.  
 
Russia does not pose an imminent threat to the CEE countries even though it is still sometimes 
viewed with suspicion; because of internal political developments rather than as a security threat 
to the Central European region. Bilateral relations with Russia are for the most past normalised 
where recently the focus has been on the settlement of Russian debts. Although the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia are still quite dependent on Russian energy supplies 
(crude oil and natural gas), this dependency especially in the cases of Slovenia and the Czech 
Republic is much less than for other countries in Central and Eastern Europe.39 Since the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary or Slovenia do not share a border with Russia this eliminates many 
contentious issues. Historical legacies are also much less controversial than in case of the Baltics 
and Poland. Russia has never been a dominating power in the CEE region except during the 
Cold War period. Although there were Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia and Hungary during the 
Communist era, they pulled out very soon after the democratic changes at the beginning of 
1990´s. Slovenia is a very special case in this respect, because it was part of Yugoslavia, and so 
Russia exerted very little influence over this country and which had much closer links with its 
Western neighbours such as Italy and Austria than with the former Soviet bloc countries.  
 
In relation to the Ukraine and perhaps other countries falling under the ENP, the picture is 
somewhat different. Two of the Central European countries – Hungary and Slovakia – share a 
common border with Ukraine, and there are certain cultural as well as economic links – given by 
                                                          
39 The Czech government intentionally kept Russian bidders out of the privatisation of Unipetrol, the state-owned oil refining 
company.   
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the presence of a Hungarian minority in the Western region of the Ukraine (Sub-Carpathian 
Ruthenia or Trans-Carpathia) as well as the historical links of Slovakia to this region (which was 
in the interwar period part of Czechoslovakia) and the presence of a Ruthenian minority in 
Slovakia. But these links are much weaker and far less important than in case of Poland.  Still, 
these two countries are likely to support a viable neighbourhood policy in relation to the Ukraine 
in particular. But to what extent the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia will push 
along with Poland for recognition of the candidate status of the Ukraine is not very clear. On the 
other hand, as the Ukraine is so dominant in terms of Polish foreign policy priorities, the other 
countries in the region may try to fill the gap and take the initiative in fostering links with other 
states in the East, such as Moldova, Belarus or the Caucasus states. But there is very little 
evidence at the moment to prove that this will indeed be the case. Furthermore, after the 
accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, the level of support for seeking closer relations with 
Moldova and the Caucasus states will increase. 
 
The region that draws much more attention from the perspective of the Central European 
countries is South-Eastern Europe or the Western Balkans. There are both general and specific 
explanations for this interest. In general terms, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and 
Slovenia enjoy special relations with the Western Balkan countries in many respects. In the case 
of Slovenia relations are perhaps strongest. Since Slovenia was once part of Yugoslavia it has very 
good knowledge and close links to the South-Eastern European region. But there are also more 
pragmatic explanations – Slovenian companies and enterprises have invested heavily over the last 
decade in many ex-Yugoslav countries,40 and for this reason the prosperity of the region and 
eventual accession into the EU is undoubtedly in Slovenia’s self-interest. Despite the fact that 
there were some contentious issues particularly in relation to Croatia, concerning the dispute over 
territorial waters in the Adriatic, this is not likely to pose any huge obstacles to support of the 
Croatian bid for EU membership (an issue to be examined later in this paper).  
 
Hungary’s interest in the region is determined by two particular factors: first is the presence of 
Hungarian minorities in Serbia (Vojvodina/Western Banat), the other one is a thousand-year 
historical link with Croatia. The minority issue has always been an important element behind 
Hungarian foreign policy thinking. The assurance of privileged treatment and the well being of 
the Hungarian diaspora will be one of the focal points for Hungarian priorities in CFSP. The 
degree to which the issue is important for Hungary was demonstrated during the Convention and 
                                                          
40 In 2000, Slovenian FDI in the four countries of ex-Yugoslavia: Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and 
Montenegro amounted to about 65% of overall Slovene foreign investment.   
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the IGC, where the Hungarian delegation was very successful in pushing through the inclusion of 
a special reference to minority rights among the values of the EU in the Constitutional Treaty. In 
practical terms, the question intensified with the accession of Hungary into the EU. 
Consideration had to be made prior to accession of the large number of ethnic Hungarians living 
outside the EU, and practical problems such as having to possess a visa when travelling to 
Hungary. The question of a large Hungarian minority, who live in Slovakia (estimated around 
450,000 ethnic Hungarians), was settled by the simultaneous accession to the EU and for 
Romania (with about 1.5 million ethnic Hungarians) this will probably happen in 2007. Thus the 
largest remaining Hungarian minority dwelling outside the EU relates to the approximately 
290,000 ethnic Hungarians (2002 estimate) living in the Vojvodina region of Serbia.41  
 
The other strong motive for the Hungarian focus on Western Balkans is the long-standing 
historical and cultural links with Croatia. Since the 12th century Croatia was joined to Hungary by 
virtue of a dynastic union that combined the Hungarian and Croatian crowns. Croats have always 
enjoyed autonomy (even after the establishment of Dual monarchy in 1867) and privileged 
treatment compared to other nationalities living under the Hungarian crown. Croatia has been 
traditionally viewed as one of the least complicated of Hungary’s neighbours, partially because of 
the absence of a large Hungarian minority.  
 
In case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, links to the Western Balkan region can also be 
explained mainly by historical and cultural motives. This stems from the fact that the Southern-
Slavic nations - Croats, Serbs, Slovenes and Bosnians who lived in Austria-Hungary often went to 
study in Prague which was the main centre of Slavic education in the Empire and there was a 
very lively intellectual exchange especially during the national revival in the nineteenth century. 
Today Croatia remains the most popular destination for Czech and Slovak tourists during the 
summer. Moreover, during the conflict in Yugoslavia Czech and Slovak diplomats were very 
active in the search for peace. Two examples illustrate this activism. First there was the 
appointment of the ex-minister of foreign affairs Mr Jiri Dientsbier as the special UN envoy for 
human rights in ex-Yugoslavia. Second, there was a Czech-Greek peace initiative that tried to 
avert military action during the imminent humanitarian crisis in Kosovo in 1999.  
 
The strong interest of the Central European states in the Western Balkans relationship with the 
EU was clearly evident when the EU Council of Foreign Ministers decided not to open accession 
negotiations with Croatia on March 17, 2005. The decision not to open the accession 
                                                          
41 Source: Government Office for Hungarians Abroad, http://www.htmh.hu/english.htm 
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negotiations in accordance with the original timetable was due to alleged non-compliance and co-
operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for ex-Yugoslavia (ICTY) – a position based 
on the opinion of its chief prosecutor Carla del Ponte. The main sticking point was seen to be the 
failure of the Croatian government to organise the surrender of General Ante Gotovina to the 
ICTY.42 The decision of the Foreign Affairs Council was strongly opposed by Hungary, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Austria. The Hungarian Prime Minister Gyurcsány even accused those member 
states that were most strongly opposed to the opening of negotiations, namely Britain, the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden, of not treating all EU candidates in the same way. However, 
success for the Central Europeans came when the European Council in April 2005 agreed, with 
the proposal of Austria and Slovakia, to re-evaluate the progress of Croatia by May 2005,43
                                                          
 thus 
leaving the option for the issue to be reopened in the summer of 2005. Nonetheless the prospect 
of this happening seems to be very unlikely since del Ponte has repeatedly claimed that Gotovina 
is within reach of Croatian authorities. Moreover it was made clear during the Luxemburg 
Presidency that failure to settle this issue would make the launch of accession negotiations 
impossible.  
 
The stance taken by the Central European states has to be understood not as a justification of the 
attitude of Croatian authorities towards the Hague Tribunal but within the broader context of 
EU policy towards the Western Balkans. The leaders of the states who support opening accession 
negotiations with Croatia believe that it is necessary to give a positive signal to the other aspirants 
that accession might become a reality. They also fear possible negative consequences of any 
decision that would lead to a drop in public support for EU integration not only in Croatia but all 
right across the region.44 On the other hand, the proponents of delaying accession negotiations 
argue that the EU has to show the other countries in the region that without full co-operation 
with the ICTY in the Hague, the prospect of joining the EU becomes highly unlikely. This stance 
relates particularly to the two most wanted war criminals – Karadzic and Mladic whose surrender 
is required from Serbia. And it seems that in this respect the Serbian authorities have understood 
the message conveyed by the recent decision of the Council.45 
 
42 Carla del Ponte claimed that the Croatian authorities were not ready to surrender the alleged war criminal, General Ante 
Gotovina or at least indicate where he is hiding.  The Croatian government claimed that General Gotovina is no longer in Croatia.   
43 The European Council also agreed to set up a team consisting of J. Solana, enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn and the 
representatives of the UK, Austria and Luxembourg, to evaluate the extent to which the Croatian authorities are co-operating 
with the International Tribunal on War Crimes and present a report of their findings.    
44 After the decision to postpone the start of negotiations, support for EU accession dropped to an unprecedented (low of) 38% 
in Croatia.  Source: Transitions Online and Eurobarometer.   
45 Another explanation for the tough stance of Carla del Ponte is that the mandate of the Tribunal is due to expire in 2010 and the 
most wanted war criminals (Gotovina, Karadzic and Mladic) still remain at large.   
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5.  Idealism versus pragmatism in foreign policy – an enduring cleavage 
between Old and New Europe? 
 
In this section consideration will be made as to whether there will be an enduring cleavage 
between the so-called ‘old’ (EU-15) and “new” member states in terms of pursuing idealistic 
rather than pragmatic goals in foreign policy making. The concept of idealism in foreign policy in 
this respect is viewed as an emphasis on issues such as human rights, rule of law, democracy, or 
more generally respect of obligations under existing international law as opposed to an approach 
that neglects some of these concerns for the sake of keeping good and friendly (not least 
economic) relations with the governments of third countries.   
 
The hypothesis examined here is not meant to suggest that the EU-15 have not pursued idealist 
goals in its foreign policy. On the contrary, the EU has consistently used its economic bargaining 
power to promote human rights, rule of law, democracy and conditionality in a number of 
countries, including the new member states before accession. It is beyond doubt that many of 
these ideals helped tremendously in transforming the societies of Central and Eastern Europe to 
become market economies, with standard democratic political systems and a high degree of 
human rights protection and legal enforcement. Without the EU’s insistence on the so-called 
Copenhagen criteria, it is likely that the transformation process would have taken much longer. 
And the same is happening, or at least beginning to happen, in countries that aspire to EU 
membership in regions such as the Balkans, the Caucasus or more recently the Ukraine. But the 
other side of the coin is that this policy is applied only in relation to countries where the EU can 
clearly apply its “carrot and stick” tactics. States that aspire to membership, or at the very least 
the economic benefits of closer ties with the EU, are in effect compelled through specific 
eligibility criteria to develop European institutions of law, democratic politics and respect for 
human rights. 
 
If we, however, take a broader look at EU policy towards countries and regions that do not 
currently enjoy preferential treatment by the EU, the picture becomes much more mixed. Such a 
mixed picture applies especially to CFSP – a domain that is still under the command of member 
states. Since the other areas of external action, such as trade agreements, humanitarian aid or 
enlargement, are mainly developed and implemented by the Commission, this framework 
provides for less involvement by member states, and consequently the opportunities for certain 
member states who have a strong interest in a particular region or a country to set the agenda at 
the EU level is much weaker.  
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The presumed idealism in foreign policy of the new member states stems from their own 
transformation experience. All of these countries widely acknowledge and accept the strong 
influence that the principles of democratic conditionality and related issues in foreign policy can 
exert over in precipitating domestic changes and reforms. And this would apply not only to 
political elites but also to vast portions of the populations in Central and Eastern Europe. Many 
of the political elites in the new member states are former dissidents who were persecuted under 
communism, and have a deep empathy for those who still suffer under authoritarian or 
undemocratic regimes. Some of the leading proponents of idealism in foreign policy in the last 
fifteen years came from Central Europe; examples include Václav Havel or Lech Walesa, who 
held top constitutional posts in the Czech Republic and Poland respectively. Thus, the emphasis 
of projecting these issues into EU foreign policy from the perspective of new member states is 
understandable for historical reasons. There are some very good examples of this idealist 
orientation despite the relatively brief involvement of CEE countries in CFSP.  
 
The most recent one relates to the deliberations of the Council of Foreign Ministers in January 
2005 over the issue of lifting diplomatic sanctions against Cuba. EU foreign ministers had 
imposed sanctions on Cuba in 2003 after Fidel Castro arrested about seventy-five dissidents in 
March of that year. In the autumn of 2004 Spain proposed a partial lifting of these sanctions after 
Castro’s administration released fourteen of these political prisoners. There seemed to be an 
overall consensus emerging among the member states that diplomatic relations should be, at least 
partially, restored. Spanish proposals went even further, arguing that the representations of EU 
member states in Havana should stop inviting Cuban dissidents to their embassies. This was seen 
as a necessary pre-condition expected by Castro’s regime for restoring diplomatic relations with 
the EU. In fact by 2004 some of the member states had already stopped inviting dissidents and 
Havana in response had started to gradually restore diplomatic relations with these countries.  
 
But there was very strong opposition from a handful of member states, headed by the Czech 
Republic and supported by Poland. The Czech Republic made a very bold move, threatening to 
use its veto over any decision of the Council that did not make restoration of diplomatic relations 
with Cuba conditional on further improvements in the situation of the dissidents. For this reason 
the Council agreed to re-evaluate the lifting of diplomatic sanctions within six months.  
Furthermore, the Czech Republic insisted that it would keep inviting dissidents to receptions at 
the Czech embassy in Havana, a policy viewed as giving strong moral support to Cuban 
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dissidents and their families.  In the Czech press, the issue was called the Czech Republic’s “first 
foreign policy victory since joining the EU”.46 
 
One may wonder why the Czech Republic was so vehement on this issue, arguing strongly 
against anything that might be viewed as a conciliatory gesture towards the last dictatorship in 
Latin America. Apart from the general background outlined above, there were other particular 
factors that played an important role in the Czech case. First, the existing links between the 
Czech Republic and Cuba from communist times still resonate in Czech society.47 But perhaps 
more important is the extent to which the Czech political class and Czech NGOs took the issue 
of supporting the Cuban democratic movement seriously. There are a number of examples to 
demonstrate this since the late 1990s. The Czech Republic has drafted several anti-Cuban 
government resolutions in the United Nations Human Rights Commission since 1999, taking the 
initiative from the United States who was previously the main critic of the Cuban regime. Leading 
Czech politicians, including Václav Havel, have consistently spoken out against Castro’s regime.  
Two members of the Czech parliament were even arrested during their trip to Cuba in 2001 
while on a mission aimed at supporting Cuban political dissidents. This occurred after a third 
Czech initiated UN resolution had been passed in the UN condemning Cuba. The release of the 
Czech parliamentarians had to be negotiated directly with President Castro by Mr Pithart, 
President of the Czech Senate. And last but not least there is the strong influence of NGOs most 
notably headed by the People in Need Foundation. This foundation runs one of the biggest projects 
in Cuba aimed at helping dissidents and their families to overcome the consequences of political 
persecution. For these reasons, the Czech Republic has become the leading European country on 
the issues of human rights in Cuba. From this perspective, the Czech position during the key 
Council decision of January 2005 is understandable. But it seems that promotion of democratic 
change has indeed become one of the focal points of Czech foreign policy. In 2004, a new unit of 
the Czech foreign ministry charged with promoting democratic transition has begun to monitor 
and evaluate the development of human rights and democracy in other parts of the world. This 
unit works in close association with NGOs co-ordinating and running programmes related to the 
restoration of human rights and democracy in various countries such as Cuba, Belarus and 
Myanmar.  
 
                                                          
46 The Prague Post, February 8, 2005.   
47 Czechoslovakia was one of the leading trade partners of Cuba before 1989; many Cubans studied in Czechoslovakia and much 
of the infrastructure in Cuba has been designed and constructed by Czech and Slovak engineers.   
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A clear strategy of putting the human rights and democracy on the foreign policy agenda can be 
sensed in relation to the countries encompassed by the EU’s near neighbourhood policy (ENP) 
and this is particularly true vis-à-vis Russia, and to a lesser extent Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine.  
It is not surprising that the Balts are the main critics of Russia’s reversion towards more 
authoritarian practices. Chechnya has become the most important issue on which the Balts have 
consistently criticised Russia on alleged human rights abuses. An astonishingly harsh criticism 
came not only from leading political figures in all three Baltic states, but also from Baltic citizens. 
Interestingly the criticism has also been directed towards the alleged ignorance of the 
international community, including such organizations as the OSCE.48 But for the Balts, this is 
quite a tricky game as they are themselves often criticized for their treatment of Russian speaking 
minorities. Given Russia’s pervasive influence among all of its smaller neighbours it is not 
surprising that the Baltic states, with relatively large Russian speaking populations, have 
developed relatively stringent minorities policies. Unfortunately for the Balts these strict minority 
policies have the effect of undermining their democratic idealism strategy. 
 
Another example that demonstrates the rather sensitive issue of adopting an appeasing stance 
towards undemocratic regimes is the question of lifting the arms embargo on China. In this case, 
although opposition came mainly from some of the old member states, notably the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Denmark, reservations were also expressed also by new member states, including 
Latvia, Poland and the Czech Republic. But unlike the question of Cuba, it is very much doubtful 
whether they were led by the same motives as Sweden and Denmark who opposed the lifting of 
the embargo mainly because of concerns over human rights abuses in China. The question of 
China is more complex for a variety of reasons. One important consideration relates to ensuring 
economic opportunities for European companies in China and more specifically promoting 
European defence industry interests in the Chinese market. Therefore firm opposition to the 
proponents of lifting the arms embargo (mainly France) would undoubtedly lead to 
complications in future relations with fellow EU member states. It is, however, rather striking 
that the new member states, especially the Balts and the Poles, did not oppose the lifting of the 
embargo because of strong opposition from Washington. Thus it is interesting to examine this 
issue in terms of the Atlanticism of the EU newcomers. On this particular issue, there does not 
seem to be evidence that the US is exerting pressure on the new member states to block the 
                                                          
48 Estonian President Lennart Meri boycotted the OSCE summit in Istanbul in November 1999, stating that the OSCE should be 
acting rather than celebrating after the renewed outbreak of atrocities in Chechnya.  The Estonian Premier Mart Laar voiced 
perhaps the strongest criticism of Russia at this OSCE summit.    
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lifting of the embargo; moreover CEE states have not shown much ‘independent’ enthusiasm for 
this course of action.  
At the same time, this point demonstrates that foreign policy idealism is not something 
specifically related to “New Europe” but we can see it in EU-15 as well. Apart from the old 
member states who opposed the lifting on the arms embargo to China, we can raise the example 
of the Netherlands which in late 2004 in their capacity of EU presidency criticised the 
developments in Russia after the Beslan attacks mainly because of idealistic motives .  
 
The Iraq issue discussed earlier also provides some interesting evidence of an idealistic approach 
to foreign policy. It was suggested that all the new EU members supported, directly or indirectly, 
the US-led coalition of the willing. But it cannot be assumed that their support for US policy on 
Iraq stemmed from the same considerations that prevailed within the US administration, even at 
the level of argumentation. While the US leadership has consistently claimed that the main 
motive for overthrowing of Saddam Hussein related to his attempt to seize weapons of mass 
destruction, thus posing a threat to world peace. For Central European states a much more 
important motive for siding with the Americans was the fact that the regime of Saddam Hussein 
was inhuman, dictatorial and was well known for using terror against its own citizens. This idea 
resonated very strongly when the Czech position was debated in the Czech parliament and most 
especially in the Senate.49 
 
Finally, signs of an idealistic approach to foreign policy may be detected in attitudes towards 
further enlargements. Most of the new member states are in favour of extending the EU beyond 
its existing borders, and this is true not only of political elites but also of citizens.50 However on 
this point, it is much more difficult to argue that the prevailing motivation of the new member 
states is based on economic considerations or wishes to bury the artificial division of the Old 
Continent. It is true that one element in this type of argument is that the EU should not become 
fortress Europe, by building prosperity inside the Union and not caring about what happens 
beyond the Union’s borders. But there are pragmatic reasons as well, that tend toward pushing 
the external border of the Union further away, thus eliminating many risks emanating from it.  
Geopolitical considerations have always been very strong in Central Europe and the idea of the 
region being a buffer zone still prevails.  
                                                          
49 See Král and Pachta: ‘Czech Republic and the Iraq Crisis: Shaping the Czech Stance,’ EUROPEUM Institute for European 
Policy, January 2005.   
50 According to Eurobarometer 62, published in December 2004, citizens of the new member states are the most supportive of 
further enlargement, with support ranging from 63% in Hungary to 78% in Poland.  This contrasts sharply with public attitudes in 
most of the old EU-15 member states.   A similar positive pattern of support for enlargement exists in candidate countries (i.e. 
Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Turkey).    
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Furthermore, it may turn out that in many respects, the countries that hope to join the EU in the 
future are likely to become direct competitors to the 2004 enlargement states – due to 
entitlements for regional and structural aid with accession and their substantially lower labour 
costs. Moreover for those 2004 accession states that want more integration in certain fields 
(thereby joining the “EU core”) further enlargement poses certain dangers, i.e. maintaining both 
the speed and uniformity of the integration process. And finally the evidence presented with 
regard to widening the EU illustrates that new member states support for future enlargement is 
for the most part predicated on specific and pragmatic considerations. In the case of Hungary it 
is the issue of Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring countries. For Poland the focus is on the 
Ukraine because it is a potentially large and powerful partner in the EU. Thus the apparently 
idealistic approach of the 2004 accession states towards further EU enlargement in reality 
contains many practical considerations. Such pragmatism is more likely to dominate the longer 
these countries are members of the EU. Long term membership is likely to prompt the 
realisation that the EU is not only about nice idealistic goals of European reunification but also 
about the daily bargaining over “bread-and-butter” issues (a process that will become ever more 
difficult with an increased number of member states).  
 
Thus predicting the degree to which the foreign policy of the new member states will remain 
associated with idealistic goals is both difficult and complex. Idealism in foreign policy during the 
1990’s based largely on the actions of prominent dissident figures is likely to fade away. As senior 
communist era dissident figures begin to retire from public life in the CEE countries a new 
generation of more pragmatic policy makers are coming to the fore. But to some extent, foreign 
policy idealism may remain more associated, at least for some years to come, with Atlanticism 
rather than with the domestic legacy of dissidents. It seems that George W. Bush’s doctrine of 
“spreading freedom in the world” might still find some ground in the more Atlanticist new 
members. They may try to use similar arguments in pursuing specific foreign policy objectives.   
 
6.  Candidate countries and CFSP 
The final part of this paper will try to highlight some issues that may arise with further 
enlargements in the area of EU foreign policy.51 The accession of the three potential candidates – 
Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey will also be very important in shaping CFSP. 
                                                          
51 Although Croatia is a candidate country as well, it will not be dealt with here as the focus of this analysis is on the Black Sea 
region. For various reasons, it can be assumed that Croatia will align with the Central European states (Hungary, Slovenia, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia) because of its interest in the Western Balkans.   
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The geographical location of the three countries of the Eastern Balkans and Asia Minor puts 
them in a specific position and pre-determines them to be strong players in the region that is of a 
crucial importance for the EU in the future. In fact, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey are a 
crossroads for several regions where the EU is already engaged: the Balkans, the Caucasus and 
the Middle East.  
 
Turkey will play a key role among the candidate countries for a variety of reasons: not solely 
because of its size giving it substantial voting power in EU institutions but also due to its role as a 
regional power and the size of its military which could make it a very important asset in ESDP.52 
Turkey has often been viewed as a very Atlanticist country. Its strategic alliance with the US is 
often regarded as one of the key elements of Turkish foreign policy.53 On the other hand, a 
certain shift in the attitudes towards the US can be detected recently. The AKP (Justice and 
Development) party of Prime Minister Erdogan has taken a much more hard-line stance, 
especially over Iraq, where the Turkish parliament voted against the stationing or movement of 
US troops through Turkey. The Transatlantic Trends Survey referred to earlier suggests that 
Turkish public opinion is the most anti-American of all the countries surveyed. Therefore there is 
no guarantee that Turkey will be another “Trojan” horse of the US in Europe. On the contrary, 
after joining the EU, it may seek to be a reassuring voice in CFSP aligning itself more with the 
autonomists rather than the Atlanticists. But as the AKP government clearly is more nationalist 
and traditionalist, much will depend on domestic political developments in Turkey.   
 
Turkey will probably be instrumental in developing closer ties between the EU and the Caucasus 
region, because of its historical and economic ties and not least because of its position as an 
energy hub through which oil and gas supplies from the Caspian basin pass to Europe (e.g. the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline). And this is also where one of the main problem lies, namely 
Turkey’s complicated relations with Armenia. At the moment, relations are frozen and it seems 
obvious that normalisation of relations will become one of the litmus tests in the EU accession 
negotiations. The key issue will be recognition of the Armenian genocide in 1915 and the deeply 
rooted conviction among Armenians that Turkey is an enemy and not to be trusted. This is 
linked to the fact that Armenia is still looking towards Russia as the main guarantor of its 
security, which gives Russia substantial influence, especially after the “loss” of Georgia. On the 
other hand, a strong Armenian diaspora in France has the potential to use the issue of unsettled 
                                                          
52 Turkish military forces under NATO command account for 27% of NATO’s total strength in Europe.   
53 S. Everts: ‘An Asset not a Model: Turkey, the EU and Wider Middle East,’ Centre for European Reform, 2004.    
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history to block Turkish accession. Thus, the normalisation of relations between Armenia and 
Turkey is crucial in many respects.  
 
As for the Middle East, it has often been argued that Turkey could be crucial in acting as an 
example to Muslim countries that Europe is not hostile to Islamic societies and cultures. In this 
respect Turkey could act as a bridge to the whole Middle East region. But this potential impact 
may be rather limited, due to Turkey’s complicated relations with Iran, Iraq and Syria, i.e. 
countries where EU diplomacy is already quite active. The strong links between Turkey and Israel 
also pose questions regarding the extent to which Turkey can act as an interlocutor with Arab 
countries in the region. On the other hand, as in the case of relations with the US, recent 
Turkish-Israeli relations have cooled with Prime Minister Erdogan being quite critical of the 
Sharon government. Undoubtedly Turkey has a lot of vital interests in the Middle East, ranging 
from water resources to the Kurdish issue. For this reason it is likely to be a very assertive player 
and unlikely to submit to any decision that could undermine its own concerns and interests. In 
any case, it is rather difficult to estimate at the moment what impact Turkish accession might 
have on CFSP. A lot will depend on internal developments in Turkey as well as on what the 
Middle East and Black Sea regions are going to look like in some fifteen to twenty years, and 
obviously on the outcome of the accession negotiations which do not automatically guarantee a 
full membership. With the complicated political developments in Europe these days, the Turkish 
accession seems to be very much off the table for the moment.  
 
The impact of the accession of Bulgaria and Romania on CFSP is easier to predict, as both 
countries will join the EU soon, probably in 2007. Considering first the issue of Atlanticism, it is 
quite likely that these two countries will follow the pattern of the other new member states in 
supporting US led policies, perhaps even more enthusiastically. Both countries strongly 
supported the US position on Iraq. In order to ensure a swift process of accession into NATO, 
both Bulgaria and Romania sent contingents to Afghanistan and Iraq and have demonstrated 
themselves to be the most loyal allies of the US in Eastern Europe. Such a stance obviously 
complicates their relations with some of the older EU member states. From the transatlantic 
perspective, the US administration views Bulgaria and Romania as being very important because 
of their stake in the Black Sea region.54 Both countries are viewed as prime examples of how 
successful democracies in the region are clearly heading for EU membership, in contrast to some 
more troublesome parts of the Black Sea region, especially along its Northern and Eastern 
                                                          
54 For further reference to the importance of the region for the US, please refer to the Jackson testimony before the Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the US Senate, March 8, 2005.   
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shores. Because of close links with the US, Bulgaria and Romania are perceived to be supportive 
of US policies in many respects, including support for pro-reform movements in various parts of 
the region. In addition, Bulgarian and Romanian accession is likely to lead to EU involvement in 
so-called “frozen conflicts”,55 and confronting the fears of perceived Russian interference 
amongst its smaller neighbouring states.  
 
The question remains to what extent the approach of Bulgaria and Romania will be based on a 
pro-active policy and to what extent it will remain US-driven. It is quite clear that Romania and 
Bulgaria on one hand and Turkey on the other may be trying to pull the EU in different 
directions. Turkey may be tempted to cosy up to Russia in terms of traditional nineteenth century 
spheres of influence thinking, especially if the current trends in foreign policy making based on 
nationalism and anti-Western sentiments endure. Movement by Turkey in this direction would be 
undoubtedly bolstered if EU negotiations proceed badly. Romania and Bulgaria might call for 
greater involvement of the EU in the region and use its soft power to turn the Black Sea region 
into a safe neighbourhood for the wider EU, a strategy very likely to be actively supported by the 
Balts and the Poles. Certainly, Russia will remain an important actor in the region and EU 
involvement will be determined to a large extent by the nature of EU-Russian relations. Given 
the virtual absence of a systematic EU policy towards Russia at the moment, Bulgarian and 
Romanian activities might complicate things further where the Black Sea region could potentially 
become – cum grano salis – another Iraq for CFSP. Needless to say, this would be very unfortunate 
and damaging for the credibility of EU foreign policy.  
 
As for more particular issues, it is quite likely that Romania will try to shape EU policy towards 
Moldova – many Moldovans posses Romanian citizenship, and the two countries are often 
considered to be culturally and linguistically one nation. In the case of Bulgaria, it is likely to align 
with countries that are active in the Western Balkans. International cooperation in the Western 
Balkans region is already well developed and this cooperation is enhanced by a significant NGO 
presence.  
 
7.  Conclusion 
This paper has shown that the track record of the new member states in the CFSP during their 
first year of membership is not as clear-cut as is sometimes assumed. The new member states 
have not and are not going to automatically side with the US on many issues regarding foreign 
                                                          
55 These include for instance Transdnistria, Southern Ossetia, Abkazia or Nagorno Karabakh.   
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policy, because of different domestic considerations, varying degrees of public support for 
alliance with the US and because of different threat perceptions. As the geographical interests of 
the new member states will vary significantly, a united “New Europe” push towards particular 
regions and issues cannot be expected. Finally, although in the recent past the political leaders in 
the new member states tended to act with what could be broadly described as an idealist 
approach to foreign policy, this phenomenon is not likely to endure either, because with 
membership of the EU, these countries are starting to realize that European integration is very 
much a pragmatic project – a characteristic that also applies to the domain of foreign policy.  
 
Given that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are not going to act as a homogenous 
bloc in shaping CFSP, certain dividing lines can be drawn across the region. These dividing lines 
are determined by the combination of three factors. The main dividing line will run between the 
three Baltic republics and Poland on one hand and the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and 
Slovenia on the other.  
 
The first group will be characterized by a strong emphasis on making CFSP compatible with US 
policies, not only in terms of defence (demonstrated by a strong focus on NATO) but also on 
other issues, such as policy towards Russia, the Ukraine, or the Black Sea region. These countries 
will also prioritise EU external action in the East, namely finding a common EU stance towards 
Russia, offering incentives to the Ukraine to keep its pro-European path chosen during the 
Orange Revolution and possibly to encouraging democratic changes in other parts of former 
Soviet Union. And because of their motivation in keeping Russia out and as far away as possible 
from Central and Eastern Europe, they will be prepared to commit themselves to helping the 
countries surrounding Russia to emerge from the Russian sphere of influence and to tie them 
more closely to the EU. For this reason, the Baltic republics and Poland will use the rhetoric of 
democracy (as opposed to authoritarian rule), rule of law and the right of countries to choose 
their own destiny as an integral part of their foreign policy activities.  
 
Poland is in a particular position because it is in terms of foreign policy priorities strongly linked 
to the Baltic states but remains anchored in Central European Co-operation initiatives (e.g. 
Visegrád and the Central European Initiative) a situation that makes it a bridge between the two 
groups. This certainly underlines its aspiration to remain a regional power and to speak on certain 
occasions on behalf of the CEE region, a fact which is only accepted with reservations, or not 
accepted at all, by Poland’s Central European neighbours.  
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Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are often perceived as one bloc but the reality is more complex. 
Firstly, there is no consistent co-ordination among them on foreign policy issues. These countries 
often chose to work through different channels. For example, Lithuania has aligned with Poland 
to steer the EU policy on the Ukraine after the Orange revolution, a move that is understandable 
for historical reasons. Estonia seems to be trying to keep a lower profile and co-ordinate its 
activities with Finland, which has a considerable influence in Brussels, given its size. Latvia, who 
seems to be lacking strong allies in the EU, is left to pursue perhaps the most Atlanticist course, 
which is apparently understood in Washington and was underlined by the stopover in Riga of 
President Bush on his way to Moscow on May 6-7, 2005. This demonstrates that the Balts, given 
their relatively small size and particular concerns, are aware of the necessity of having strong allies 
to be able to contribute to EU foreign policy. Furthermore the Balts have seen the merits of 
working through the European Parliament.  
 
The situation in the remaining Central European states is considerably different. For them, the 
issue of developing a strong and coherent policy towards Russia is far less important, because 
Russia is viewed as much less of an external or domestic threat. They are more likely to exert 
pressure in the EU to focus on the Western Balkans where they have strong stakes (albeit for 
different reasons). Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia adopted a particularly hard line on the issue of 
(not) opening accession negotiations with Croatia. The Atlanticist commitment of Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia is not equally intense as there is no uniform consensus 
among national political elites that siding with the US is always the best option. Moreover public 
opinion is less Atlanticist in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia than in the 
Baltic/Poland group, which gives the governments in these four countries even more leeway to 
“Europeanize” their foreign policy. The new member states idealism in foreign policy was 
perhaps best demonstrated by the Czech position on Cuba, but this phenomenon is likely to be 
an exception rather than the rule and will probably diminish as the main proponent of this policy 
- Václav Havel – has retired from active politics. In general, Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Slovenia can be described as being more “relaxed” in terms of foreign policy, giving 
them more flexibility in shaping their positions or balancing out different groupings inside the 
EU. However such a relaxed stance gives them less leverage in shaping decision-making within 
the EU as a whole.  
 
In conclusion, it is not possible to give a definite answer to Wessel’s contentions as to what 
scenarios the new EU member states are going to follow in CFSP. This is because the 2004 
accession states cannot be viewed as a compact bloc. It seems that in the Czech Republic, 
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Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary future foreign policy strategies are likely to exhibit patterns 
consonant with both the neutral and optimistic scenarios. These countries have kept quite a low 
profile on most foreign policy issues discussed in the Council since accession, with the notable 
exception of the Czech Republic on the Cuban issue. Such a low profile strategy helped to repair 
the transatlantic rifts over Iraq. In the case of Poland and the Balts, these countries have been 
more active in attempting to shape the EU’s relationship towards Russia. The impact of Baltic 
and Polish policy in this regard has been rather mixed. It maybe assumed that their push for a 
more comprehensive EU-Russia policy is mainly driven by domestic considerations and this is 
particularly true in the case of the Balts. Such a situation is suggestive of a pessimistic scenario. 
However given the virtual non-existence of any common EU policy towards Russia, they cannot 
be blamed for this as other EU member states, notably France, Germany and Italy, have behaved 
in a similar way. Thus, we can trace elements of neutral, optimistic and pessimistic behaviours and 
strategies among the new member states in their attempts to shape EU foreign policy. Whether 
any of these scenarios will eventually predominate or whether future developments will continue 
to exhibit a combination of all three behaviours and strategies remains to be seen.  
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